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-fact that a certificate for the formation of a
limited partnership, as provided -by the stat-
ute, is made out and signed by the parties,
but is not recorded, has no tendency, in the
absence of extrinsic evidence, to show that
they actually entered into business as part-
iners, to prove a general partnership.
37
37 Gray v. Gibson, 6 Mich. 300.
FARMING ON SH&RES.
The courts have been called upon in a num-
rber of cases to pass on the question of the
Telation which exists between the owner of
Vthe land, and one who works it upon shares
under an agreement with the owner. The
number of times that this question has been
Tresented, is evidenie of the uncertainty and
perplexity which have been supposed to prevail
:in relation to the matter. As the question in-
,volved is not without its importance, it may
(be interesting to consider the subject, and
ascertain what the principles are which gov-
,er in such cases.
The cases on this subject may be classified
-under three heads, as giving rise to the rela-
4ionship of partners, of tenants in common,
.and of landlord and tenant. We shall con-
-sider them in this order. We mayvobserve
,in the first place, that it is settled that the
mere fact that it is agreed.that the one shall
-furnish the land, and that the other shall oc-
.cupy and cultivate the land, dividing the
crops in a certain proportion, will not create
the relation of partners between the] parties
.so contracting.' It is clear that such an
agreement does not contain any essential ele-
ment of a partnership, but it has been held
that where the owner of the land was to fur-
.nish half the labor and the necessary teams,
the other party giving his personal services to
the supervision of the cultivation of the farm,
the expenses of the plantation to be borne by
them equally, and the proceeds to be equally
divided between them, that a partnership was
theieby created between them.2  So where
1 Donnell v. Harshe, 67 Mo. 170; Musser v. Brink,
,6S Mo. 242; Holloway v. Brinkley, 42 Ga. 226; Smith
v. Summerlin, 4S Ga. 425; Christian v. Crocker, 25
.Ark. 30.
2 McCrary v. Slaughter, 58 Ala. 230.
the agreement was that one should contribute
the land and stock for its cultivation, and
that the other should contribute personal skill
and labor, and other stock, each to furnish a
specified proportion of the food for the ani-
mals, and to pay equally the expenses of the
plantation, the crops to be equally divided be-
tween them, it was held that the contracting
parties wer partners, and not tenants in com-
mon. The court declared that there was,
perhaps, no question of greater difficulty and
more embairassed by contrariety of judicial
decision, "than to determine when a contract
like that we are considering creates a part-
nership inter sese, br an agency or employ-
ment for services in the one party, or a ten-
ancy in common of the profits or products of
a common enterprise." There being mani-
festly a community of interest in profit and
loss under the 6ontract in question, the court
determined the relation existing between them
to be that of partners.3  So in a case in
North Carolina a similar conclusion was ar-
rived at, where the agreement was that one
was to furnish the outfit and the land, and
the other was to hire the laborers and super-
intend the farm, the former agreeing to
provide money to carry on the business,
half of which was to be repaid to him, the
profits to be divided between them.4 So,
too, in a case in the Supreme Courtof Geor-
gia, where two had agreed that one should
furnish the land and stock, the other
the labor and the pay for it, while each
was to pay one -half the feed of the
stock and laborers and all other plantation
expenses, and when the crop was made they
were to divide the same share and share alike,
the ruling was that as to the crop thus made,
the parties were inter sese partners. 5 In an-
other case in the same court, where a father
and son farmed together under an agreement
that the father was to furnish the land and the
stock, and the provisions for the stock, while
the son was to furnish the hands and to super-
intend the work, the crop being equally divi-
ded between them, it was held that so far as
third persons were concerned, they were
partners in the enterprise. The ev;idence,
said the court, "shows that they were jointly
interested in the profits and losses of the
3 Autrey v. Frieze, 59 Ala. 587.
4 Reynolds v. Pool, 84 N. C. 37.
5 Holifield v. White, 52 Ga. 567.
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crop. '"6 It is evident that where the agree-
ment is of such a natuie that the parties are
to share in the profits and losses of the en-.
terprise, the courts hold that the parties are,
as between themselves at least, partners. So,
where there is a contract by which a laborer
undertakes to make a crop for a given share
of it, it is held that the contract does not cre-
ate a partnership between the parties.7 Con-
tract may create the relation of partnership;
one partner does not possess any power as
such to borrow money, or to draw and in-
dorse bills of exchange or promissory
notes.8  The relation must be governed
by the general rules of *partnership, and
one partner has not, without the consent of
the other, any power to bind the partnership
by any contract not connected with the part-
nership business, and within its scope. The
power to borrow money, or to draw and in-
dorse bills and notes, does not pertain to such
a partnership any more than it does to the
partnership of law or of medicine. Such a
power is not necessary or %ppropriate, to the
business of farming.
If we pass now to those cases which hold
that the relation between the parties is that
of tenants in common, we shall be compelled,
in the same connection, to consider the third
class of cases, holding that the relation is
that of landlord and tenant. The cases run
into each other, and can not be very well
separately considered. In Stewart v. Dough-
ty, 9 decided as early as 1812, the New York
Supreme Court passed on the character of
this relation. In that case the articles of
agreement declared that the owner of the
land "rented and hired, and suffered the les-
see to possess and enjoy the farm, and gave
him the quiet and uninterrupted possession,"
etc. It was further agreed that the owner
was to receive one-half of the crops which
should be raised under the agreement. Mr.
Chief Justice Kent delivered the opinion of
the court, saying: "An interest in the soil
passed, and the lessee would have been enti-
tled to an action of trespass, for any unlaw-
6 Adams v. Carter, 53 Ga. 160.
7 Hunt v. Wing, 57 Tenn. 139, 149; Mann v. Taylor,
52 Tenn. 267.
8 McCrary v. Slaughter, 58 Ala. 235, citing Collyer
on Partn., sec. 402, p. 366; Story on Partn., sec. 126;
Lea v. Gulce, 18 S. & M. 656.
99 Johnson, 112.
ful entry upon it; the proportions of the pro-
ductions of the farm which the tenant waso
yearly to render, was a payment of rent in
kind. They were not tenants in common of:
the crops and productions raised. The inter-
est and property in the crops was exclusively
in the tenant, until he had separated and de-
livered to the lessor his proportion." But in,
1841 the same question was again raised in
that court, and this time a contrary conclu-
sion was reached, the case being that of Put-
nam Vj. Wise.' 0  In this case, the words of
demise and covenant to'pay a t;hare of the
crop, were almost literally, and, in the opin-
ion of the court, clearly in legal effect, the.
same as in the earlier case. The opinion was.
announced by Mr. Justice Cowen, and there.
was no dissent. The authorities were care-
fully considered. "It is a case in which we.
ought not to tie ourselves up to the consider--
ation of mere words ;" so runs the opinion.
"The substance should be looked at; and,
that, as it would be universally understood
-among farmers, is an agreement between own--
ers and occupants, that the latter should come
in rather as servants than tenants; each par-
ty taking an interest as common owners in.
the crops and other products as they accrue,
by way of compensation to the owners for the
use of their farm, and the occupiers for their
labor. X * * * The true test seems to
lie in the question, whether there be any pro-
vision, in whatever form, for dividing the spe.
cific products of the premises. If there be,
a tenancy in common arises, at least in suclh
products as are to be divided. The occupier
being a mere servant, it is said, can not bring
trespass quare clausum fregit, but the owner
only." His possession is that of the owner.12
He has no interest in the land which he can
assign, and on his death the contract would
be at an end."
In Caswell v. Dietrich,' 3 decided by the
same court in 1836, five years prior to Put-
nam v. Wise, and twenty-four years after the
case of Stewart v. Doughty, the court held,
as in Putnam v. Wise, that the agreement be-
tween the parties was not strictly a lease.
"There is nothing," said Mr. Justice Nelson,
10 1 Hill, 234.
11 Hare v. Celey, Cro. Eliz. 143; Robertson v. George,
7 N. H. 306, 308.
12 Maverick v. Lewis, 8 McCord, 211.
13 15 Wend. 379.
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"which indicates that the stipulation for a
portion of the crops was by way of rent; but
the contrary. The shares were of the specific
-crops raised -upon the farm. It is very mate-
Tial to the landlord, ind no injury to the ten-
.ant, that this view of the contract should be
maintained, unless otherwise clearly express-
ed, for then the landlord has an interest to
the extent of his share in the crops. If it is
deemed rent, the whole interest belongs to the
tenant until a division. Where a farm is let
for a year upon shares, the landlord looks to
his interest in the crops as his security, and
thereby is enabled to accommodate tenants,
who otherwise would not be trusted for the
rent." It was held that the parties were ten-
:ants in common of the crops, and a distinc-
tion was taken between the case under
-consideration and that of Stewart v. Doughty.
In respect to this distinction, it is interesting
to note the observation of Mr. Justice Cowen
in Putnam v. Wise, which was as follows:
"He (Nelson, J.,) thought the case distin-
guishable frQm Stewart v. Doughty, where
the phraseology being that usual in leases,
could not be got over by the agreement to
pay in shares from the specific crops. With
deference, I have not been able to make any
substantial distinction in the phiaseology.
Independently of the fact that the render was
confined to a share in the specific crop, it
would, as appears to me, ii both cases, have
operated to make a lease." Putnam v. Wise
must be regarded as flatly overruling Stewart
v. Doughty. And the former case must be
regarded as stating the law of New York at
the present time. That case has never been
overruled, but the courts have recognized and
followed it in subsequent cases. The last
time the subject was considered in New York
was in 1868, in Taylor v. Bradley. 1" The
opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Wood-
ruff, who was evidently dissatisfied with the
opinion expressed in Putnam v. Wise, for he
declared: "If the question were new, I
should say, unhesitatingly, that each case
ought to be chiefly governed by the language
employed by the parties to express their in-
tention. Nor do I perceive any legal objec-
tion to a stipulation in a lease for the payment
of rent in wheat or other product of the land
leased," and more to the same effect. He,
14 39 N. Y. 129.
nevertheless, felt bound by authority to ad-
here to the doctrine announced in Putnam v.
Wise, saying: "Notwithstanding these sug-
gestions, the balance of the authorities above
cited seems to be, that, notwithstanding the
technical terms employed, such an agreement
does, not amount to a technital lease; that the
relation of landlord and tenant is not contem-
plated, and the portion of the crops reserved
to the owner is aot rent, but compensation for
the use of the land, while the other portion is
compensation to the occupier, for his work,
labor and services, etc. ; and that the legal
possession of the land is in the owner, and
the two are tenants in common of the crop."
Other New York cases to the same effect are
cited in the note below. 15
A similar view of this question has been
taken in Vermont. In Aiken v. Smith,' 6 de-
cided in that State in 1849, the articles of
agreement set forth that the said Smith-
"agrees to let" his farm, etc., the produce to
be divided equally. The question arose,
whether the agreement was such as to consti-
tute a lease of the land, and vest the whole
interest in the crops in the lessee. The court
declared that it doubtless gave the party of
the second part an interest in the land, yet
that it did not constitute a lease of the land.
"No obligation rests upon Austin to pay any
certain quantity of produce, and the right of
Smith to demand any is contingent, and de-
pendent upon what may be raised, be the
same more or less. We think the parties
could have only contemplated a common in-
terest in the crops." They were held to be
tenants in common of the crops. 17
In Lowe v, Miller,18 decided in the cour
of appeals of Virginia in 1846, the facts were
as follows: One who was in possession of
land to which he had no title, but which he
was authorized to rent out for his own bene-
fit, made a written contract to let the land for
a year to one A, who was to board him and
his family, work the crop and give him one-
half of it when gathered. It was held that
this could not be considered a lease rendering
15 Duechard v. Wilson, 15 Barb. 595; De Mott v.
Hagerman, 8 Cow. 220; Bradlsh v. Schenck, 8 Johns.
151; Foot v. Colvin, 3 Johns. 215; Tripp V. Riley, 15
Barb. 335; Harrower v. Cole, 19 Barb. 331.
162 1 Vt. 172.
17 See, also, Smith v. Doty, 1 Vt. 37; Iturd v. Dar-
ling, 14 Vt. 214; s. c., 16 Vt. 877.
188 Grattan, 205.
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rent in kind, as the reservation of the one-half
of the crop was not incident to the reversion,
and consequently gave no right of distress.
The parties were considered joint tenants of
the crop.
In Somers v. Joyce, 19 decided in 1873, the
agreement was that A "leased, demised and
to farm let," and that the products were to be
divided. The opinion was by the former
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut, sitting as arbitrator. It was held
that the agreement was not a lease, and that
the parties were joint owners of the products.
The theory that such an agreement constitu-
ted a lease was said to be "now generally re-
pudiated, except where the terms of the
contract clearly indicate that the parties in-
tend to come into the relation of mere lessor
and lessee." Another case decided in the
Supreme Court of that State seems to be to
the same effect. 20
Is there any rule of law which will prevent
the occupant of land under an agreement
which constitutes him a tenznt in common
with the owner in the crops, from having as
entire a control over the premises during the
term as a tenant covenanting to pay a money
rent would have? In other words, can those
who are tenants in common of the crops stand
to each other in the conventional relation of
landlord and tenant? From the opinion just
quoted it is evident that in New York the
opinion seems to be that the relation of land-
lord and tenant does not exist between the
parties in such cases. This precise question
was considered in California in 1864, in Walls
v. Preston, 21 the opinion being announced
by Mr. Justice Rhodes, who said: "We can
see nothing incompatible in the tenant of the
land under a lease, being, at the same time,
a tenant in common of the crops, and there
never would have been any doubt upon this
point, had not the judges in New York, in
passing upon questions concerning the rights
of the parties to the possession of the crops,
uttered dicta which seemed to determine the
point against the occupant." It was held
that while the relation was that of landlord
and tenant, the parties were tenants in com-
mon of the crops. And so in Missouri in
19 40 Conn. 592.
20 Herskell v. Bushnell
21 25 Cal., 59.
onn
the case of Johnson v. Hoffman, 22 decided- im
1873, the parties were hld to stand in the re-
lation of landlord and tenant as to the land,.
but as tenants in common as to the crops..
"The rights of the defendant in the crops, as-
tenant in common, were not inconsistent with,
their relations as landlord and tenant."
In Smyth v. Tankersley, 23 however, decided,
in the Sqpreme Court of Alabama in 1852, a,
contrary view of this question was taken, al-
though that case seems not to have fallen un-
der the notice either of the Missouri or Cali-
fornia court. "If this contract was a lease,.
then the whole product of the land rented be-
longed to the lessee, until the share of the
lessor had been separated and delivered; 24
while, on the contrary, if it was only a letting
of the land on shares, then the parties to the
agreement were tenants in common of the
products to be grown and divided between.
them." And the court stated the rule to be.
that a contract made with the owner of land,
which the other party agreed to cultivate, andh
to divide the products equally with him, was,
not, technically speaking, a lease, but that at
tenancy in common was created in the pro-
ducts. "It is true," said the court, "that.
the phraseology adopted is that which is usu-
al in leases, but the substance of the agree-
ment is to be regarded rather than the words;.
and, in contracts of this description, the true-
test seems to be, that wherever provision is
made for dividing the specific products of the.
land, a tenancy in common results."
One of the most exhaustive and satisfac-
tory discussions of this general subject that
can be found in the books, is that contained,
in the opinion of Mr. Justice Bell :n Moulton
v. Robinson,2 5 decided in New Hampshire in
185-1. It was there held that in case of: a,
letting on shares the relation of landlord and
tenant was created as to the land, while the.
parties were tenants in common of the crops,
the part of the profits of land reserved on.
the lease not being regarded as rent, but held,
to be an exception from. the grant of the
profits ordinarily implied in a letting to hire.
The court considered it settled that a reserva-
tion of a part of the profits, could not be
22 53 Mo., 504.
23 20 Ala., 212.
24 Stewart v. Doughty, 9 John. 108; Thompson, v..
Mawhinny, 17 Ala. 362.
25 27 N. H., 550.
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regarded as rent by the books usually looked
to as authoritative on such subjects.'6 In a
subsequent case in the same court in 1875,the
doctrine is reasserted that the relation of
landlord and tenant exists as to the land.
2 7
In a case decided in the Maryland Court of
Appeals in 184G," s the court held the parties
to be in the relation of landlord and tenant as
to the land, and of tenancy in common as to
the crops. We give in the note below other
cases in which the parties have been held to
stand in the relation of tenants in common
to the crops. 29 It is held, however, that when
the crops to be divided are to be paid distinc-
tively as rent, that then the relation is that of
landlord and tenant. 30 And it has been held
that in such cases the title to the crops re-
mains exclusively in the tenant until the stip-
ulated portion is set-off to the landlord.
31
In a case decided in New Jzrsey, it was
held that no matter what the relation between
the parties was, whether that of landlord and
tenant, or of tenant in common of the crops,
the tenant could sell the crop and pass a good
title to a bona fide purchaser.
3 2
In Illinois in determining whether the relation
is that of landlord and tenant or not,the court
said: "In general, the question of possession
will determine the matter. Take the case where
the tenant moves on to the farm, and occu-
pies and controls it exclusively, as if it were
his for the time being, and is by the agree-
ment so to occupy it for the year, it would be
deemed to be in his exclusive possession, and
it would be held to be a lease of the farm for
the year, although the rent was to be paid in
a part of the crops, the amount of which was
to be determined by the amount of the crops
raised; when the the tenant would be held to
be the exclusive owner of the crop until the
26 Touchstone, p. 80; 4 Cruise Dig., 312; Comyn's
Landl. & Ten., 95.
27 Wentworth v. Portsmouth, etc. R. Co., 55 N. 11.,
540.
28 Terrall v. Kent, 4 Gill. 212.
29 Betts v. Raliff, 50 Miss. 561; Doty v. Beth, 52
Miss. 530, 535; Shields v. Kimbrough, 64 Ala. 504;
Smith V. Rice, 56 Ala. 417; Swanner v. Swanner, 50
Ala. 66; -Williams v Cleaver, 4 Houst. (Del.) 453; Mc-
Nealy v. State, 17 Fla. 198; Bernal v. Hovious, 17
Cal. 544: Knox v. Marshall, 19 Cal. 617.
30 Walls v. Preston, 25 Cal. 59, 62; Alwood v. Ruck-
man, 19 I1. 200; Dixon v. Niccolls, 39 Ill. 372.
31 Dixon v. Niccolls, 39 I1. 372; Alwood v. Ruck-
man, 19 I1. 200; Sargent v. Courrier, 66 Ill. 246;
Dockham v. Parker, 9 Greenl. (MIe.) 137.
32 Doremus v. Howard, 3 Zab. 390.
stioulated rent was set off to the landlord.
O. the other hand, in a ease where the owner
of the farm resided upon it, and continued,
to exercise control over it as the owner, and
allows another to cultivate a crop upon a
part, or even the whole of it, and is to receive
a portion of the crop as his compensation for
the use of the land, we should not presume a.
tenancy, nor hold the person who cultivates
it, to be in the exclusive possession of the
portion which he cultivates, and the parties
would be tenants in common of the crops." 33
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
a3 Alwood v. Ruckman, 19 Ill. 200.
PROHIBITION- NUISANCE - ABATEMEN''
BY INJUNCTION. •
STATE v. CRAWFORD.
Supreme Court of Kansas, October 31, 1882.
A drinking saloon in which intoxicating liquors are
sold repeatedly, continuously and persistently, in ut-
ter violation and defti-nce of the Constitution and
statutes of the State, and are sold to be drank on the
premises as-4- beverage, is a public nuisance; and
this is so, not merely because of the express provisions
of the statute declaring such places to be nuisances,
(See. 13 of the Prohibitory Act of 1881,) but it is als&
so from the necessary imolications of the statute, and
by the direct force of the statutes, which make the
keeping of the saloon and the consummation of each.
sale of intoxicating liquors criminal offenses; and It
is so because of the repeated, continuouq and persist-
ent violation of the statutes. Such a nuisance may
be "shut up and abated" under the provisions of
said see 13 of the Prohibitory Act of 1881. But it can
not ordinarily be perpetually enjoined by a court of
equity. And this want of power in a court ot equity
is not because of the fact that the keeping of the sa-
loon is a criminal offense, and Involves the commis-
sion of many criminal offenses, but because the stat-
ute (said sec. 18) affords another complete and ade-
quate remedy,
Error from Shawnee County.
VALENTINE, J., delivered the opinion of the
court:
This action was originally instituted in the dis-
trict co~lrt of Shawnee county, Kansas, by the
county attorney of such county, in the name of
the State, for the purpose of perpetually enjoin-
ing the further continuance of ,n illegal liquor
saloon, in which intoxicating liquors were ille-
gally, continuously and persistently sold, to be
drank on the premises as a beverage. G. N.
Boutell, the keeper of the saloon, and Lester M.
Crawford, the owner of the building in which the
saloon was kept were made'parties defendant.
Other kinds of business, not illegal; were also
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